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Abstract
I study optimal disclosure policies in sequential contests. A contest designer
chooses at which periods to publicly disclose the efforts of previous contestants.
I provide results for a wide range of possible objectives for the contest designer.
While different objectives involve different trade-offs, I show that under many cir-
cumstances the optimal contest is one of the three basic contest structures widely
studied in the literature: simultaneous, first-mover, or sequential contest.
JEL: C72, C73, D72, D82
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1 Introduction
In this paper, I study sequential contests and contest-like economic interactions, where
the payoffs increase with participants’ own efforts and decrease with the total effort. For
example, lobbyists exert efforts to influence politicians towards desired outcomes. The
key regulatory decision is transparency—how much and what kind of information should
be collected and disclosed to limit the rent-seeking efforts? A fully transparent lobbying
disclosure rule would lead to sequential effort choices, whereas a non-transparent policy
leads to independent choices of lobbying efforts.1 Similarly, firms entering oligopolistic
markets invest to increase capacity and the market price decreases with the total capacity.
Again, transparency plays a crucial role in these investment decisions and it is natural
to ask whether the investments should be publicly observable or not. Many economic
interactions satisfy the assumptions of the model discussed here, including oligopolies,
public goods provision, rent-seeking, research and development, advertising, and sports.
The objective of the contest designer depends on the specific economic problem. Two
standard goals discussed in the literature are maximizing the total effort (such as in
∗I would like to thank Federico Boffa, Juan Carlos Carbajal, Dino Gerardi, Marit Hinnosaar, Ignacio
Monzón, and Emil Temnyalov for their comments and suggestions.
†Collegio Carlo Alberto, toomas@hinnosaar.net.
‡The latest version: toomas.hinnosaar.net/contest_architecture.pdf.
1Different countries have adopted different transparency rules regulating lobbying. For example, in
the United States lobbying efforts are all recorded and reported quarterly (Lobbying Disclosure Act,
1995; Honest Leadership and Open Government Act, 2007), whereas in the European Union reporting is
arranged on a more voluntary basis and on a yearly frequency (European Transparency Initiative, 2005).
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research and development contests) or minimizing the total effort (as in rent-seeking
contests). However, other objectives are more natural in other situations. For example,
a school’s objective is not to maximize the average effort, but rather to make sure that
all students learn. In fact, the education reform in the US was named the No Child
Left Behind Act of 2001. Similarly, in firms where efforts are complementary, it is often
important to incentivize the lowest-performing employees, referred to in the business
terminology as to as the bottleneck or the weakest link. In welfare economics, there are
two standard assumptions. The utilitarian social planner maximizes the total welfare of
the participants, whereas the Rawlsian social planner maximizes the lowest utility.
Different objectives lead to different trade-offs and it is natural that the optimal con-
tests in various economic interactions may differ. However, the literature has so far
almost exclusively focused on three standard types of contests. First, simultaneous con-
tests, where the players make their choices independently. This is the least informative
form of contest, where no efforts are disclosed. It is the most common type of contest
considered by the literature, starting with Cournot (1838) in oligopoly theory and Tul-
lock (1967, 1974) in contest theory. The second type of contest that has been extensively
studied is the first-mover contest, where a single first-mover chooses the effort first and
the rest of the players move simultaneously in the second period. In oligopoly theory it
was first analyzed by von Stackelberg (1934) and in contest theory by Dixit (1987).2 The
third type of contest that has been considered is the sequential contest, where all effort
choices are public. Then each player observes all the previous effort choices. Simultane-
ous contests have been studied by Robson (1990) in the case of large oligopolies, Glazer
and Hassin (2000), Hinnosaar (2018), and Kahana and Klunover (2018) in the case of
sequential Tullock contests, and Hinnosaar (2018) with more general payoff functions.
The goal of this paper is to understand which types of contests are optimal under
different circumstances. On one hand, the paper aims to provide a menu of optimality re-
sults that researchers and practitioners could build upon. Perhaps even more importantly,
finding contest structures that are optimal under many different sets of assumptions may
explain why these types of contests are often used.
The main difficulty in studying sequential contests is tractability. Sequential games
with non-quadratic payoffs are typically difficult to solve because best-response functions
are non-linear and therefore the standard backward-induction approach leads to increas-
ingly complex expressions. This problem is even more pronounced in contest design, where
the goal is to compare all possible contests. In this paper, I build on recent progress in
aggregative games (Jensen, 2010; Martimort and Stole, 2012; Acemoglu and Jensen, 2013)
and sequential contests (Hinnosaar, 2018, 2019) to overcome the tractability issues.
The main finding of the paper is that under many circumstances the optimal contest
is one of the three basic contest structures widely studied in the literature. In particular, I
consider minimizing and maximizing eight different objectives: total effort, total welfare,
lowest effort, lowest payoff, highest effort, highest payoff, effort inequality, and payoff
inequality. I show that nine out of the sixteen maximization problems are solved either
by the simultaneous contest or by the sequential contests. With the four out of the
remaining five objectives I show that when the number of players is sufficiently large,
they are maximized by one of the three basic contest structures mentioned above. I also
2For literature reviews on dynamic contests, see Konrad (2009) and Vojnović (2015).
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provide conditions under which the same conclusions hold when the number of players is
small. Finally, there is a single exception: minimizing the highest payoff, which typically
requires a non-standard contest.3
The paper contributes to both the contest design and the information design litera-
tures. Earlier papers on contest design have focused on contests with private information
and have studied how to arrange contests into subcontests and which prizes to offer to
maximize either total effort or highest effort (Glazer and Hassin, 1988; Taylor, 1995; Che
and Gale, 2003; Moldovanu and Sela, 2001, 2006; Olszewski and Siegel, 2016; Bimpikis
et al., 2019). In this paper, I study contest design with full information. The designer
may have different objectives and can choose to disclose less or more information about
the players’ efforts. There is growing literature on information design (Kamenica and
Gentzkow, 2011; Bergemann and Morris, 2019), which has mostly focused on revealing
information about the state of the world or private information. This paper is more in
line with recent papers that have also studied disclosure of the actions of other players
(Doval and Ely, 2019; Ely and Szydlowski, 2019; Gallice and Monzón, 2019).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 provides
all results, describing the contests that minimize and maximize eight different objective
functions. Section 4 summarizes and concludes. Proofs are in the appendix.
2 Model
There is a finite number n players, N = {1, . . . , n}. Players arrive sequentially and
each player i ∈ N chooses effort level xi ≥ 0 at arrival. For a given profile of efforts
x = (x1, . . . , xn), the payoff of player i is ui(x) = xih(X), where X =
∑n
i=1 xi denotes the
total effort and h(X) is the marginal benefit of effort, which is common to all players (I
discuss its properties below).
The contest designer chooses points of time at which to publicly disclose the cumulative
effort of all players that have already arrived. The disclosure rule is chosen before effort
choices and is commonly known. Each such disclosure rule induces a partition of players
I = (I1, . . . , IT ), where It is the set of players arriving between disclosures number
t − 1 and t. I refer to the set of players It as players arriving in period t. Then player
i ∈ It observes the cumulative effort of all players arriving in previous periods, Xt−1 =∑t−1
s=1
∑
j∈Is xj, and makes a choice simultaneously with all players arriving in period t.
As all players are identical, the disclosure rule is equivalently defined by a vector n =
(n1, . . . , nT ), where nt = #It, so that ∑Tt=1 nt = n.4
The marginal benefit function h(X) is a strictly decreasing and continuously differ-
entiable function in [0, X], where X > 0 is the saturation point so that h(X) = 0.
Moreover, I impose two technical assumptions, which are discussed in appendix A. The
first assumption guarantees that the best-response functions are well-behaved so that a
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium exists and is unique. The second assumption guar-
antees that the efforts are higher-order strategic substitutes near equilibrium, i.e. higher
effort of an earlier-mover discourages efforts by followers both directly and indirectly
3I provide conditions under which it is maximized by a contest where the first two players are moving
simultaneously and all the remaining players are arranged sequentially.
4Alternatively, the contest designer’s problem can be interpreted as dividing players between periods.
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(through the changed efforts of other players). Both assumptions are satisfied for most
applications, including the following three examples.
Example 1 (Sequential Tullock Contest). Players choose efforts to compete for a prize
with value v > 0 and have constant marginal cost c > 0. The probability of winning is
proportional to efforts. The payoffs can be expressed as ui(x) = xiX v−cxi = xih(X), where
h(X) = v
X
− c.
Example 2 (Tragedy of the Commons). The total amount of resources is 1 and each
player chooses private consumption xi ≥ 0. Marginal benefit of consumption is linearly
decreasing in the total consumption, i.e. h(X) = 1−X.5
Example 3 (Oligopoly with a Non-linear Demand Function). Suppose that n oligopolists
have identical constant marginal costs c ≥ 0 and produce identical good. Each oligopolist
chooses a quantity (capacity) and the inverse demand function is P (X) = a−bX for some
a > 1 and b > 1. The profit of firm i is ui(x) = xih(X), where h(X) = P (X)− c.
To compare different contests, I define informativeness as a partial order on all n-
player contests. Intuitively, a contest n is equivalently defined by a partition I of players.
Each additional disclosure divides the players in one period It into two groups. Therefore
the new contest provides strictly more information to some players than the previous
contest, whereas no player receives less information. Formally, I say that the contest n̂ is
more informative than the contest n, if the corresponding partition Î is finer than I.
In particular, the simultaneous contest n = (n) that does not provide any information
about the efforts of other players is less informative than any other contest. In the other
extreme, the sequential contest n = (1, 1, . . . , 1) discloses efforts after each player and
is therefore more informative than any other contest. Finally, the first-mover contest
n = (1, n− 1) discloses information after the first player, whereas all other players make
their moves simultaneously. The first-mover contest is less informative than any other
single-leader contest n = (1, n1, . . . , nT ).
3 Optimal Contests
3.1 Total Effort and Total Welfare
The most common objectives considered in the literature are minimizing or maximizing
the total equilibrium effort X∗. Hinnosaar (2018) showed that the total effort is strictly
increasing in the informativeness of the contest, i.e. each additional disclosure increases
the total equilibrium effort X∗. Therefore the simultaneous contest minimizes and the se-
quential contest maximizes the total equilibrium effort. The intuition for this result comes
from the discouragement effect. Efforts in contests are strategic substitutes. Therefore,
5This example can be interpreted as private provision of public goods, where each player divides
endowment ωi between private consumption xi and public good contribution gi = ωi − xi. Suppose that
the total endowment is 1, so that the total quantity of public good is
∑n
i=1 gi = 1 − X. The payoff is
a multiplicative function of both private consumption and public good, for example ui(·) = xi(1 − X).
The marginal benefit function h(X) can be non-linear.
4
with each additional public disclosure, each earlier-mover whose effort is now made visi-
ble to some additional later-movers has an additional incentive to increase the effort—it
discourages these later-movers from exerting high effort. Moreover, in equilibrium this
effect must be less than one-to-one, i.e. the decrease in efforts by later-movers is smaller
than the increase in efforts by earlier-movers. Otherwise, a marginal increase in the effort
xi of an earlier-mover i would decrease the total effort X and therefore increase i’s payoff.
This would be a profitable deviation and thus violate equilibrium conditions.
Let us now look at total equilibrium welfare. For example, in the case of a normalized
Tullock contest the total welfare is W (x∗) = ∑ni=1 ui(x∗) = 1 − X∗. This expression
is decreasing in X∗, so maximized by the simultaneous contest and minimized by the
sequential contest. The intuition is simple—in a Tullock contest, the total prize is fixed.
Additional players and additional disclosures lead to a higher total effort, which is costly
and therefore welfare-reducing. The following proposition shows that these conclusions
generalize to arbitrary payoffs and an arbitrary number of players.
Proposition 1 (Total Effort and Total Welfare). The total equilibrium effort X∗ is min-
imized by the simultaneous contest and maximized by the sequential contest. The total
equilibrium welfare W (x∗) = ∑ni=1 ui(x∗) is minimized by the sequential contest and max-
imized by the simultaneous contest.
3.2 Lowest Effort and Lowest Payoff
We need to first determine who is the player choosing the lowest effort in equilibrium
and who gets the lowest payoff. The answer comes from the earlier-mover advantage—
equilibrium efforts and payoffs of earlier-movers who are observed by more players are
higher than the corresponding efforts and payoffs of later-movers.6 Therefore player n
chooses the lowest effort and gets the lowest payoff with any n-player contest n. The
reason for this result is again the discouragement effect—earlier players choose higher
efforts to discourage later players from exerting effort whenever their efforts are made
public. By doing so, earlier players ensure higher and later players get lower payoffs.
The following proposition shows that both the lowest effort and the lowest payoff
are minimized and maximized by the same contests as the total welfare—sequential and
simultaneous contests respectively. The intuition is simple. As discussed above, each
additional disclosure leads to higher efforts by earlier-movers and lower efforts by later-
movers. Therefore the discouragement effect to the last player n is increased with each
disclosure. Moreover, additional disclosures lead to higher total equilibrium effort X∗,
which reduces the payoff of the last player even further.
Proposition 2 (Lowest Effort and Lowest Payoff). Lowest equilibrium effort mini{x∗i }
and lowest equilibrium payoff mini{ui(x∗)} are minimized by the sequential contest and
maximized by the simultaneous contest.
3.3 Highest Effort and Highest Payoff
The earlier-mover advantage result shows that the player who exerts the highest effort
and gets the highest payoff is the first player. It is easy to see that the effort of player 1
6See appendix A for a formal discussion.
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is minimized by the simultaneous contest. This is the contest which minimizes the total
effort X∗ and where all efforts are equal. In all other contests, the total effort is higher
and the effort of player 1 is higher than the average, due to the discouragement effect,
which means higher than in the simultaneous contest. Indeed, this is what figure 1a
confirms—for each n, the highest equilibrium effort is minimized by the simultaneous
contest.
Maximization of the highest effort x∗1 is the first objective, where the optimal solution is
not always one of the extremes, i.e. simultaneous or sequential contest. For example, let us
consider three-player Tullock contests with a single leader.7 There are two such contests.
The first-mover contest n = (1, 2) has a total equilibrium effort X∗ = 0.75 and the highest
effort x∗1 = 0.375. Adding a disclosure after player 2 makes the contest sequential, i.e.
n̂ = (1, 1, 1). As argued above, this raises the total effort to X̂∗ ≈ 0.7887. This reduces
the marginal benefit of effort for all players. However, it also makes the discouragement
effect of player 1 stronger through indirect influence. Note that players 2 and 3 already
observed the effort of player 1, so the direct discouragement effect is unchanged. However,
in the sequential contest player 3 observes player 2, who is influenced by player 1. In the
case of Tullock contest payoffs the first effect dominates and the leader’s equilibrium
effort reduces to x̂∗1 ≈ 0.3591 < x∗1. Numerical calculations summarized by figure 1a show
that the contest that maximizes the highest equilibrium effort in a Tullock contest with
2 < n ≤ 12 players is always one with a single leader and followers that are arranged
pairwise, i.e. n = (1, 2, . . . , 2) when n is odd or n = (1, 2, . . . , 2, 1) when n is even.8
Arranging the followers pairwise leads to a strictly higher effort by the first player than
in any other contest, including the sequential contest.
The observation that there should be a single first-mover is general and intuitive.
Making first-movers’ effort observable to all players increases total effort only because
of increased effort by the first player, so there is no trade-off. As discussed above, each
additional disclosure has two opposite effects and the effect on highest effort depends
on the weights to direct and indirect influences. For example, with exponential function
h(X) = 1log 2
[
2−X − 2−1
]
the first-mover contest n = (1, 2) gives highest effort x∗1 ≈
0.3698, whereas the sequential contest n̂ = (1, 1, 1) gives strictly larger highest effort
x̂∗1 ≈ 0.3714 > x∗1. The literature on sequential oligopolies (starting from (Daughety,
1990)) has found that if the demand function is linear, then Stackelberg leaders behave
as if there are no followers, i.e. x∗1 would be independent on the number and arrangement
of followers. Hinnosaar (2019) provides the most general formulation of this Stackelberg
independence result, but also shows that this result holds only when h(X) function is
linear. Therefore the formal statement, in this case, provides only a qualitative result,
showing that n1 = 1. Indeed, as any single-leader is optimal in the case of linear h(X),
the result cannot exclude any such contest from being optimal.
Finally, in the case when n is large enough, we can say more regardless of the exact
details of the payoff function. Namely, in this case, X∗ is close to its upper bound and
therefore assuming that h(X) function is smooth, it can be closely approximated by a
7In numerical examples, I normalize the prize and marginal cost to 1, so that the payoff of player i is
ui(x) = xiX − xi. For figures, I consider
∑12
n=2 2n−1 = 4094 possible contests with 2 to 12 players. I use
the Matlab code available at toomas.hinnosaar.net/contests/.
8The location of the second single-player period does not affect x∗1.
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(a) Highest effort. Green dash-dotted line indi-
cates the single-leader contest with pairwise fol-
lowers. The slightly lower red dash-dotted line
indicates the first-mover contest.
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(b) Highest payoff. Green dash-dotted line indi-
cates contests n = (1, n−1) and red long-dashed
line indicates contests (2, 1, . . . , 1).
Figure 1: Highest effort maxi{x∗i } and highest payoff maxi{ui(x∗)} in all normalized
Tullock contests with 2 ≤ n ≤ 12 players. The solid black line indicates sequential
contests and dashed blue line simultaneous contests.
linear function. In particular, this means that the conclusion from linear demand extends
here—any large single-leader contest leads to the highest effort that is arbitrarily close
to the maximized highest effort. Figure 1a also illustrates that while all single-leader
contests are optimal in the limit, for the sequential contest the convergence is very fast,
whereas for the first-mover contest the convergence is much slower.9
Proposition 3 (Highest Effort). The highest effort maxi{x∗i } is minimized by simulta-
neous contest. If contest n maximizes the highest effort then n1 = 1. If h(X) is linear or
n is large enough, then any single-leader contest ensures highest effort that is arbitrarily
close to maximum.
Maximizing highest equilibrium payoff u1(x∗) balances a similar trade-off, but the
downward force through reduced marginal benefit h(X∗) is more pronounced. Not only
does it push effort down, but it also reduces h(X∗), which directly reduces all payoffs. This
means that we would naturally expect the optimal contest to have fewer disclosures than
the contest that maximizes the highest equilibrium effort. Indeed, figure 1b shows that
among all Tullock contests with up to 12 players, the first-mover contest n = (1, n− 1) is
always optimal.
The proposition below formalizes this qualitative property—a contest that maximizes
the highest equilibrium effort must have a single leader and has to be (weakly) less infor-
mative than a contest that maximizes the highest payoff. For example, in the case of linear
h(X) function, one maximizer of the highest effort is the first-mover contest n = (1, n−1).
As all other contests with a single leader are more informative, the immediate conclusion
is that the first-mover contest is the unique maximizer of the highest payoff. In the case
9The same arguments can be used to find the contest that minimizes or maximizes the i-th highest
effort or payoff when h(X) is linear or n is large enough. Appendix D provides these results.
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of linear h(X) function or a large number of players, we can therefore uniquely determine
the optimal contest. It is always n = (1, n−1), which confirms the finding from figure 1b.
Minimizing the highest payoff u1(x∗) requires balancing a different trade-off. As we
saw above, additional disclosures lead to larger highest effort due to a stronger discour-
agement effect. This would imply that minimizing the highest payoff requires a relatively
uninformative contest. On the other hand, additional disclosures lead to a higher total
effort, which reduces all payoffs. Let us compare for example three-player Tullock con-
tests n = (2, 1) and n̂ = (1, 1, 1). Contest n gives total effort X∗ = 0.75, highest effort
x∗1 ≈ 0.2813 and therefore highest payoff u1(x∗) ≈ 0.0938. Contest n̂ gives total effort
X̂∗ ≈ 0.7887 > X∗, but highest effort x̂∗1 ≈ 0.3591, which is much larger than x∗1 and
therefore highest payoff u1(x̂∗) = 0.0962 > u1(x∗). Figure 1b shows that in the case of
a Tullock contest with up to 12 players, contest n = (2, 1, . . . , 1) minimizes the highest
payoff.
The formal result below provides only one general qualitative property for the contest
that minimizes the highest payoff: the number of players in the first period must be
weakly higher than in any other period, i.e. n1 ≥ nt for all t. If this would not be the
case, the designer could rearrange the groups while keeping the total effort unchanged
and decreasing the highest effort, which would reduce the highest payoff.10 Why can’t we
say more? Other possible manipulations of the contests, such as moving a player from
period 1 to period 2 or splitting up the period by an additional disclosure, lead to two
opposite effects: on one hand they increase the total effort in the contest, which reduces
all efforts as well as the payoffs directly, but on the other hand they increase the influence
that the first player has through the discouragement effect. The relative magnitudes of
these effects depend on the shape of the function h(X).
In the case of linear h(X) or large contests, the optimal contest is again uniquely
determined: it is always (2, 1, . . . , 1).11 This confirms the finding from figure 1b.
Proposition 4 (Highest Payoff). If contest n = (n1, . . . , nT ) minimizes the highest equi-
librium payoff maxi{ui(x∗)}, then n1 ≥ nt for all t. If h(X) is linear or n is large enough,
then the optimal contest is n = (2, 1, 1, . . . , 1).
If contest n maximizes the highest equilibrium payoff, then n1 = 1 and n is not more
informative than any maximizer of the highest effort. If h(X) is linear or n is large
enough, then the optimal contest is n = (1, n− 1).
3.4 Effort Inequality and Payoff Inequality
In this final part I study equilibrium effort inequality, defined as maxi{x∗i } − mini{x∗i },
and equilibrium payoff inequality, defined as maxi{ui(x∗)}−mini{ui(x∗)}. By the earlier-
mover advantage result discussed above, these expressions are equivalent to x∗1 − x∗n and
u1(x∗)− un(x∗) respectively. It is easy to see that both expressions are minimized by the
10This comes from the independence of permutations result from Hinnosaar (2018), which shows that
total equilibrium effort X∗ is independent of permutations of vector n = (n1, . . . , nT ).
11Remark: when n is very large, h(X∗) → h(X) = 0 and therefore ui(x∗) → 0 for all i, which means
that technically all contests are approximately optimal. However, as figure 1b illustrates, in some contests
this convergence is much faster than in others. By optimality I mean here the contest for which the value
of the objective is maximized for large but finite values of n.
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simultaneous contest since this is the only contest where efforts and payoffs are equal for
all players.
Maximization of effort inequality and payoff inequality leads to additional trade-offs.
Consider the effort inequality first. As seen above, minimizing the lowest effort requires
an informative contest. On the other hand, maximizing highest effort may involve pooling
some of the later-movers. Therefore the effort inequality is maximized by a contest that
is (weakly) more informative than the contest that maximizes the highest effort. Indeed,
as figure 2a shows, in Tullock contests with up to 12 players the first effect dominates
and the optimal contest is sequential. Let us compare again Tullock contests n = (1, 2)
and n̂ = (1, 1, 1). The first contest leads to maximized highest effort x∗1 = 0.375, but also
relatively high lowest effort x∗3 = 0.1875. The sequential contest n̂ leads to slightly lower
highest effort x̂∗1 ≈ 0.3591, but the impact to the lowest effort is bigger, x̂∗3 ≈ 0.1667.
Therefore the sequential contest maximizes the effort inequality.
The formal proposition proves these qualitative properties. It shows that the payoff-
inequality-maximizing contest must have a single leader and it cannot be less informative
than any contest that maximizes the highest effort. In the case when h(X) is linear or
n is large, the most informative maximizer of the highest effort is the sequential contest.
Therefore, we can immediately conclude that the sequential contest must also be the
unique maximizer of the equilibrium effort inequality, which confirms the result from
figure 2a.
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(a) Effort inequality
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(b) Payoff inequality. Green dot-dashed line in-
dicates the first-mover contest.
Figure 2: Effort inequality maxi{x∗i } − mini{x∗i } and payoff inequality maxi{ui(x∗)} −
mini{ui(x∗)} in all normalized Tullock contests with 2 ≤ n ≤ 12 players. The solid black
line indicates sequential contests and simultaneous contests lie on the horizontal axis.
Finally, maximizing payoff inequality has an additional first-order effect: disclosures
increase X∗ and thus reduce all payoffs. This effect mechanically reduces payoff inequality
as u1(x∗) − u1(x∗) = (x∗1 − x∗n)h(X∗). In the three-player examples above, x∗1 − x∗n =
0.1875 < x̂∗1 − x̂∗3 ≈ 0.1925. However, h(X∗) ≈ 0.3333 < X̂∗ ≈ 0.2679. Therefore this
additional effect is larger and n = (1, 2) is the three-player contest that maximizes payoff
inequality. Figure 2b shows that in the case of Tullock contests, this effect is strong
enough so that for all n ≤ 12, the contest that maximizes payoff inequality is always the
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first-mover contest n = (1, n− 1).
The proposition below shows that the contest that maximizes payoff inequality must
have a single leader. It is more informative than any maximizer of the highest payoff
and less informative than any maximizer of the effort inequality. When h(X) function is
linear or the contest is large, these conditions, unfortunately, are not very informative. All
single-leader contests are more informative than the highest payoff maximizer (1, n − 1)
and all contests are less informative than the effort inequality maximizer, which is the
sequential contest. The proposition shows that we can in this case nevertheless uniquely
determine that the optimal contest is the first-mover contest n = (1, n− 1).12
Proposition 5 (Effort Inequality and Payoff Inequality). Both the equilibrium effort
inequality maxi{x∗i } − mini{x∗i } and the equilibrium payoff inequality maxi{ui(x∗)} −
mini{ui(x∗)} are minimized by the simultaneous contest.
If contest n maximizes the equilibrium effort inequality, then n1 = 1 and n is not
less informative than any maximizer of the highest effort. If h(X) is linear or n is large
enough, then n is the sequential contest.
Any contest n that maximizes the equilibrium payoff inequality must satisfy n1 = 1.
Moreover, it cannot be less informative than any maximizer of the highest payoff and it
cannot be more informative than any maximizer of the effort inequality. If h(X) is linear
or n is large enough, then n is the first-mover contest.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, I studied contest architecture with public disclosures. Additional disclosures
induce the discouragement effect that leads to higher efforts by earlier-movers, lower
efforts by later-movers, and higher total effort. These effects have different implications
to different objectives a contest designer may have. The optimal contests are summarized
by table 1. Perhaps the most surprising finding of the paper is that for most objectives
the optimal contest is one of the three standard contests the previous literature has been
focused on—the simultaneous contest, the sequential contest, or the first-mover contest.
12Again, subject to a remark: when n becomes large then all payoffs converge to zero and therefore
any contest approximately maximizes the payoff inequality. However as figure 2b clearly illustrates,
u1(x∗)−un(x∗) in the first-mover contest converges to zero much faster than other contests. The optimal
contest here means that it maximizes the payoff inequality with finite but arbitrarily large n.
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Objective function Minimizer Maximizer
Total effort X∗ = ∑ni=1 x∗i Simultaneous Sequential
Total welfare ∑ni=1 ui(x∗)
Sequential SimultaneousLowest effort mini{x∗i }
Lowest payoff mini{ui(x∗)}
Highest effort maxi{x∗i } Simultaneous Single-leader†
Highest payoff maxi{ui(x∗)} (2, 1, . . . , 1)† First-mover†
Effort inequality maxi{x∗i } −mini{x∗i } Simultaneous Sequential
†
Payoff inequality maxi{ui(x∗)} −mini{ui(x∗)} First-mover†
Table 1: Summary of the optimal contests for the 8× 2 = 16 objectives discussed in the
paper. Contests marked with † are optimal at least for (1) Tullock contests with n ≤ 12,
(2) contests with linear h(X) function for any n, and (3) large contests. The simultaneous
contest is (n), the sequential contest is (1, 1, . . . , 1), the first-mover contest is (1, n − 1),
and single-leader contest are (1, n2, . . . , nT ) for all n2, . . . , nT (including the sequential
and the first-mover contests).
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Appendices for Online Publication
A Notation, Assumptions, and Useful Results
In this appendix, I describe additional notation and formalize technical assumptions that
are necessary for formal proofs. I then describe a few useful results from the literature.
A.1 Notation
Instead of working directly with the marginal benefit function h(X) it is more convenient
to work with the following functions g, g1, . . . , gT . Each of these function captures a
particular curvature property of h function and can be interpreted as a higher-order
strategic substitutability term.
Definition 1 (Functions g and gk). Let g(X) = − h(X)h′(X) . With this, let us define g1, . . . , gT
recursively as g1(X) = g(X) and gk+1(X) = −g′k(X)g(X).
For example, in the case of linear h(X) = a(X −X), g(X) = X −X = gk(X) for all
k. In the case of normalized Tullock payoffs ui(x) = xiX − xi and so h(X) = 1X − 1 and
g(X) = X(1−X). Therefore gk(X) is a polynomial of degree k + 1.
For a contest n let us define its measures of information. Intuitively, it is a vector of
integers, that captures the number of direct and indirect observations of other players’
efforts. Let me describe the construction with an example of contest n = (1, 2, 3). Each
player observes its own effort. This is captured by the first measure S1(n) = 1+2+3 = 6.
The second measure is the number of direct observations of other players’ efforts, S2(n) =
1 · 2 + 1 · 3 + 2 · 3 = 11. The third measure captures observations of observations, i.e.
influences through one connection. In particular, S3(n) = 1 ·2 ·3 = 6 (for example, player
1 influences player 2, who in turn influences player 4). Therefore S(n) = (6, 11, 6) in the
example.
Definition 2 (Measures of Information S(n)). For a given contest n = (n1, . . . , nT ), its
measures of information are defined as S(n) = (S1(n), . . . , ST (n)), where Sk(n) is the
sum of products of all possible k-combinations of the set {n1, . . . , nT}.
For each period t, let nt denote the subcontest starting after period t, i.e. nt =
(nt+1, . . . , nT ). Then S(nt) are denoted analogously to the original contest. For example,
if n = (1, 2, 3), then n1 = (2, 3) and n2 = (3), therefore S(n1) = (5, 6) and S(n2) = (3).
Finally, let me define functions f0, . . . , fT as follows13
ft(X) = X −
T−t∑
k=1
Sk(nt)gk(X). (1)
These functions take the role of inverted best-response functions that I discuss below.
Intuitively, the inverse functions f−1t (Xt) describe what is the total effort X when after
period t the cumulative effort is Xt and all players after period t behave optimally.
13Note that when t = 0, then nt = n is the whole contest.
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A.2 Technical Assumptions
The first technical assumption is sufficient to guarantee that the best-response functions of
players are well-behaved. This is a sufficient assumption to guarantee both the existence
and uniqueness of the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium for contest n.
Assumption 1 (Inverted Best-Responses are Well-Behaved). For all t = 0, . . . , T − 1,
the function ft defined by equation (1) has the following properties:
1. ft(X) = 0 has a root in [X t+1, X].14 Let X t be the highest such root.
2. ft(X) < 0 for all X ∈ [X t+1, X t).
3. f ′t(X) > 0 for all X ∈ [X t, X].
Moreover, X0 ∈ (0, X).
The second assumption states that the efforts are higher-order strategic substitutes
near equilibrium. This assumption is stronger than the standard assumption of strategic
substitutes, which requires that higher effort of an opponent reduces the incentive for
a player to exert effort. Higher-order influences matter in sequential games, where the
earlier-mover may not only influence a follower directly but indirectly through changing
the behavior of some players between them.
Assumption 2 (Higher-Order Strategic Substitutes). gk(X∗) > 0 for all k = 2, . . . , T .
Hinnosaar (2018) shows that the two assumptions are satisfied for Tullock contests
with at least three players as well as in many other situations with well-behaving marginal
benefit functions.
A.3 Useful Results
The proofs rely on a few useful results from earlier works. The main tool for the analysis is
the characterization theorem, which characterizes the unique equilibrium for any contests.
Theorem 1 (Characterization Theorem (Hinnosaar, 2018)). Under assumption 1 the
total equilibrium effort X∗ is the highest root of f0(X) = 0, where
f0(X) = X −
T∑
k=1
Sk(n)gk(X). (2)
The equilibrium effort of player i in period t is x∗i = g1(X∗) +
∑T−t
k=1 Sk(nt)gk+1(X∗).
Informativeness and equilibria: As Hinnosaar (2018) shows, this result has strong
implications for equilibrium behavior. The total equilibrium effort X∗ increases with the
informativeness of the contest. Therefore it is minimized by the simultaneous contest (the
least informative contest) and maximized by the sequential contest (the most informative
contest).
14Function fT (X) = X, therefore it has exactly one root, XT = 0.
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Independence of permutations: permutations in n do not change the total equilib-
rium effort X∗. For example, the contest n = (1, 2, 3) has exactly the same total effort
as the contest n̂ = (1, 3, 2) because S(n̂) = (6, 11, 6) = S(n). Of course, individual efforts
may be affected, as they also depend on subcontest. But note that permutations within
the subcontest do not affect individual equilibrium effort either: in the examples here,
n1 = (2, 3) and n̂1 = (3, 2) is a permutation. Therefore x̂∗1 = x∗1.
Earlier-mover advantage: take two players, i from period t and j from a later period
s > t. Then x∗i > x∗j and ui(x∗) > uj(x∗). As explained in the text, this means that
highest effort is always maxi{x∗i } = x∗1, lowest effort mini{x∗i } = x∗n, highest payoff
maxi{ui(x∗)} = u1(x∗), and lowest playoff mini{ui(x∗)} = un(x∗).
Large contests: Moreover, Hinnosaar (2019) shows that in the limit when the number
of players becomes large, the equilibrium behavior converges to specific functional form.
Intuitively, as the number of players becomes large and the total equilibrium effort in-
creases with the number of players, it is quite natural that the total equilibrium effort
converges to its full dissipation limit X. As the function h(X) is smooth, we can approx-
imate it with a linear function near X arbitrarily closely when the number of players is
large. Therefore it is not surprising that the equilibrium behavior of individual players
converges to equilibrium behavior of the same game but with linear h(X) function.
Theorem 2 (Competitive Limits (Hinnosaar, 2019)). Fix a sequence n = (n1, . . . , nT )
and let us increase nt at a particular period t, while keeping other elements of the sequence
n unchanged. Then limnt→∞X∗ = X and for each player i arriving in period s,
lim
nt→∞
x∗i =
0 ∀s ≥ t,X∏s
k=1(1+nk)
∀s < t. (3)
I use this result as follows. Note that nt is not determined, as with different n the con-
test designer may want to use different disclosures. I use equation (3) as an approximation
for the equilibrium behavior, i.e. each player i ∈ Is chooses
x∗i ≈
X∏s
k=1(1 + nk)
. (4)
Note that this approximation also implies that
X∗ =
n∑
i=1
x∗i ≈ X −
X∏T
k=1(1 + nk)
. (5)
Since h(X) is a smooth function and X∗ → X, we can approximate h(X∗) linearly near
X, i.e.
h(X∗) ≈ h(X) + h′(X)(X −X∗) = αX∏T
k=1(1 + nk)
, where α = −h′(X) > 0. (6)
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B Proofs
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1 (Total Effort and Total Welfare)
Results for X∗ follow from theorem 1. The total welfare is W (x∗) = X∗h(X∗), so
dW (x∗)
dX∗
= h(X∗) +X∗h′(X∗) ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ X∗ ≥ − h(X
∗)
h′(X∗) = g(X
∗). (7)
Note that by theorem 1, each x∗i ≥ g(X∗), therefore this condition is always satisfied.
Each disclosure increases X∗ and therefore decreases total welfare.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 2 (Lowest Effort and Lowest Payoff)
As argued in the text, mini{x∗i } = x∗n and by theorem 1, x∗n = g(X∗). Since g(X∗) is
strictly decreasing in X∗, the lowest effort x∗i is minimized when X∗ is maximized, i.e. by
sequential contest, and maximized when X∗ is minimized, i.e. by simultaneous contest.
Similarly, mini{ui(x∗)} = un(x∗) = x∗nh(X∗) = g(X∗)h(X∗), where both g and h are
decreasing in X∗, which leads to the same conclusion.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 3 (Highest Effort)
Let us first consider minimization of the highest equilibrium effort maxi{x∗i } = x∗1. Let
Xsim be the total equilibrium effort from simultaneous n-player contest (n). Then clearly
the highest equilibrium effort xsimi = X
sim
n
. Now take any non-simultaneous contest.
As this contest is strictly more informative than the simultaneous contest, X∗ > Xsim.
Moreover, by the earlier-mover advantage result, the highest effort is strictly larger than
the average, which proves the claim, since
x∗1 >
X∗
n
>
Xsim
n
= xsim1 . (8)
Suppose now that n maximizes the highest effort, which by theorem 1 is
max
i
{x∗i } = x∗1 = g1(X∗) +
T−1∑
k=1
Sk(n1)gk+1(X∗). (9)
I first claim that n1 < nt for all t. If this is not the case, we can take a permutation of n,
which leaves X∗ unchanged, but increases the information measures of the subcontest n1,
therefore increasing the highest effort. Next, I claim that n1 = 1. Suppose that this is not
the case, i.e. 2 ≤ n1 But the previous observation, n2 ≥ n1 ≥ 2. Consider an alternative
contest n̂ = (n1 − 1, n2 + 1, n3, . . . , nT ). Then n̂1 = (n2 + 1, n3, . . . , nT ). Since n2 ≥ n1,
we have
(n1 − 1)(n2 + 1) = n1n2 − n2 + n1 − 1 < n1n2.
Therefore S2(n̂) < S2(n) and S(n̂) < S(n). Therefore X̂∗ < X∗. This means that each
gk(X̂∗) > gk(X∗). Moreover, clearly S(n̂1) > S(n1). Therefore x̂∗1 > x∗1, which means
that x∗1 was not the maximal highest effort.
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Finally, when the h(X) is linear or when number of players is large, then by the argu-
ments above, the highest effort is (approximately) x∗1 ≈ X1+n1 . Clearly, this is maximized
by setting n1 = 1, i.e. a disclosure right after the first player. All other disclosures have
no impact when h(X) is linear and a negligible impact when n is large enough.
B.4 Proof of Proposition 4 (Highest Payoff)
Let n be a contest that minimizes the highest equilibrium payoffmaxi{ui(x∗)} = u1(x∗) =
x∗1h(X∗). I claim that n1 ≥ nt for all t. If this is not the case, then there exists a
permutation of n such that x∗1 is increased and X∗ and thus h(X∗) is unchanged. This
would violate the optimality of n. When n is large, then by the highest equilibrium payoff
is approximately
u1(x∗) = x∗1h(X∗) ≈
X
1 + n1
αX∏T
s=1(1 + ns)
. (10)
Minimizing this objective is equivalent to maximizing (1 + n1)2
∏T
s=2(1 + ns). We can do
it in two steps. First, fix n1 ≥ 1 and choose optimal subcontest, which therefore needs
to maximize ∏Ts=2(1 + ns) subject to constraint that ∑Ts=1 ns = n − n1. Splitting each
ns ≥ 2 onto n′s > 0 and n′′s > 0 always increases the product as (1 + n′s)(1 + n′′s) =
1+n′s+n′′s +n′sn′′s > 1+n′s+n′′s . Therefore the maximized product
∏T
s=2(1+ns) = 2n−n1
and so the maximization problem is
2n max
1≤n1≤n
(1 + n1)22−n1 . (11)
Treating n1 as a continuous variable and differentiating the objective gives
−2−n1(1 + n1) ((1 + n1) log 2− 2) ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ n1 ≤ 2log 2 − 1 ≈ 1.8854. (12)
The objective is decreasing in n1 for all n1 ≥ 2, so there are only two candidates for the
maximizer: either n1 = 1 or n1 = 2. Direct comparison gives
(1 + 1)22−1 = 2 < (1 + 2)22−2 = 94 . (13)
Therefore the optimal large contest is n = (2, 1, . . . , 1).
Let n be a maximizer of the highest payoff u1(x∗) = x∗1h(X∗). The same arguments
as in the proof of proposition 3 show that n1 must be equal to 1 (first n1 ≤ nt for all t,
otherwise can take a permutation, and then if n1 > 1, splitting it makes the contest less
homogeneous and thus decreases X∗, which increases total payoff while also increasing
player 1’s share in it). Now, let n̂ be a contest that maximizes the highest effort. Let the
corresponding effort profile be x̂∗. Then by definition x∗1 ≤ x̂∗ and u1(x∗) = x∗1h(X∗) ≥
x̂∗1h(X̂∗) = u1(x̂∗), which cannot be satisfied unless X∗ ≤ X̂∗. Therefore n cannot be
more informative than n̂.
The final claim follows from the arguments above. With linear h(X) or large n, one
contest that maximizes the highest effort is n̂ = (1, n−1). As the highest payoff maximizer
must have n1 = 1 and cannot be more informative than n̂, it must coincide with n̂.
18
B.5 Proof of Proposition 5 (Effort Inequality and Payoff In-
equality)
As argued in the text, the simultaneous contest is the only contest where the efforts and
payoffs of all players are equal, so it is the unique minimizer of both the equilibrium effort
inequality maxi{x∗i } − mini{x∗i } = x∗1 − x∗n as well as the equilibrium payoff inequality
maxi{ui(x∗)} −mini{ui(x∗)} = u1(x∗)− un(x∗).
By the same arguments as with the highest effort and with the highest payoff, we get
that n1 = 1 both with effort inequality and payoff inequality maximizers. Note that since
x∗1 is independent of permutations of the subcontest n1 and x∗n = g(X∗) is independent
of permutations in the whole contest, both inequalities are independent of permutations
in n1.
Suppose that n is an effort inequality maximizer and let the corresponding equilibrium
effort profile be x∗. Take any highest effort maximizer n̂ and let the corresponding effort
profile be x̂. Then by construction, x∗1 ≤ x̂∗1 and x∗1 − x∗n ≥ x̂∗1 − x̂∗n, which implies
that g(X∗) = x∗n ≤ x̂∗n = g(X̂∗). As g(X∗) is decreasing in X∗ it implies X∗ ≥ X̂∗,
which means that n cannot be less informative than n̂. Finally, if h(X) is linear or n is
large, then any single-leader contest maximizes the highest effort. One such contest is the
sequential contest, which is more informative than any other contest. Therefore it must
be the unique maximizer of the effort inequality in these cases.
Now, let n be the maximizer of the equilibrium payoff inequality. As argued above,
n1 = 1. Take any maximizer of the highest payoff n̂. Then u1(x∗) − un(x∗) ≥ u1(x̂∗) −
un(x̂∗) ≥ u1(x∗) − un(x̂∗) and therefore g(X∗)h(X∗) = un(x∗) ≤ un(x̂∗) = g(X̂∗)h(X̂∗),
which implies that X∗ ≥ X̂∗. This means that n cannot be less informative than n̂. Next,
suppose that x̂ maximizes the effort inequality. Then (x∗1−x∗n)h(X∗) ≥ (x̂∗1− x̂∗n)h(X̂∗) ≥
(x∗1 − x∗n)h(X̂∗), which implies h(X∗) ≥ h(X̂∗) or equivalently X∗ ≤ X̂∗. Therefore n
cannot be more informative than n̂.
When h(X) is linear or n is large, the results above do not tell us much, since none of
the single-leader contests is less informative than (1, n− 1) (the maximizer of the highest
payoff) and no contest is more informative than the sequential contest (the maximizer of
the effort inequality). Therefore we have to proceed with direct proof. The equilibrium
payoff inequality is (approximately)
u1(x∗)− un(x∗) ≈ X1 + n1
αX∏T
s=1(1 + ns)
− X∏T
s=1(1 + ns)
αX∏T
s=1(1 + ns)
= αX
2
(1 + n1)2
1∏T
s=2(1 + ns)
[
1− 1∏T
s=2(1 + ns)
]
. (14)
I already proved that n1 = 1 for any payoffs, including linear. The remaining question
is how to arrange the remaining n − 1 players into subcontest n1 = (n1, . . . , nT ). Let us
denote Y (n1) = 1∏T
s=2(1+ns)
for brevity. Then Y (n1) is decreasing with each disclosure.
Combining this with the fact that the optimal contest is not simultaneous, we get Y (n1) ≤
1
1+n−n1 ≤ 12 . Now, note that the expression Y (n1)[1−Y (n1)] is strictly increasing in Y (n1)
for all Y (n1) < 12 . Therefore maximization of payoff inequality requires that there are no
disclosures after period 1, i.e. Y (n1) = 11+n−n1 =
1
n
. This implies that the optimal contest
is the first-mover contest n = (1, n− 1).
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C Additional Figures
For completeness, I include here the figures describing the total equilibrium effort (fig-
ure 3a), total equilibrium welfare (figure 3b), lowest equilibrium effort (figure 4a), and
lowest equilibrium payoff (figure 4b) in all Tullock contests with 2 to 12 players. The
figures confirm fully general findings discussed in the text—in each of these eight possible
cases the optimal contest is either the sequential contest or the simultaneous contest.
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Figure 3: Total equilibrium effort X∗ and total equilibrium welfare W (x∗) in all normal-
ized Tullock contests with 2 ≤ n ≤ 12 players. The solid black line indicates sequential
contests and dashed blue line simultaneous contests.
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Figure 4: Lowest effort mini{x∗i } and lowest payoff mini{ui(x∗)} in all normalized Tullock
contests with 2 ≤ n ≤ 12 players. The solid black line indicates sequential contests and
dashed blue line simultaneous contests.
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D Minimizing or Maximizing the i-th Highest Effort
and Payoff
In the case of linear h(X) or large n, the problem is simple enough to consider other
objectives. Consider for example i-th highest effort. By the earlier-mover advantage
result, it is the effort of player i ∈ It. If h(X) is linear or n is large, it is (approximately)
x∗i ≈
X∏t
k=1(1 + nk)
. (15)
Remember the general trade-off: each disclosure reduces the marginal benefit of effort for
all players and therefore pushes all efforts downwards, but it increases the efforts of earlier-
movers whose effort is now made public. Therefore each disclosure before the arrival of
player i only has the former effect and therefore reduces x∗i . Therefore minimizing x∗i
requires players before i to be arranged sequentially and maximizing requires them to
be simultaneous (i.e. no disclosures prior to i). Disclosures after player i have the two
opposite effects, so their impact depends on the relative magnitudes. However, in the
case considered here (linear demand), they are exactly equal and therefore balance out.
Therefore x∗i is independent on the choice of disclosures after the period player i arrives.15
This allows us to state the following simple proposition.
Proposition 6. When h(X) is linear or n is large
1. The contest that has i − 1 first players arranged sequentially and the rest of the
players arriving simultaneously, i.e. n = (1, . . . , 1, n + 1 − i), minimizes the i-th
largest effort.
2. Any contest that has i players in the first period, i.e. n = (i, n2, . . . , nT ), maximizes
the i-th largest effort.
When i = n and i = 1 this result confirms propositions 2 and 3: lowest effort (i = n) is
minimized by sequential and maximized by sequential contest, and highest effort (i = 1)
is minimized by the simultaneous contest and maximized by any single-leader contest.
We can analogously study the i-th highest payoff ui(x∗), which is (approximately)
ui(x∗) = x∗ih(X∗) ≈
X∏t
k=1(1 + nk)
αX∏T
k=1(1 + nk)
. (16)
Now there are three effects. First, all disclosures before the arrival of player i decrease
both x∗i and h(X∗) and thus decrease ui(x∗). Second, all disclosures after period t (when
i arrives) leave x∗i unaffected, but decrease h(X∗), thus decreasing ui(x∗). And third, the
length of period t, i.e. delaying the first disclosure after the arrival of player i, has two
opposite effects—it reduces x∗i but increases h(X∗). Combining these effects gives us the
following proposition.
Proposition 7. When h(X) is linear or n is large
15This is the Stackelberg Independence property of a standard sequential homogeneous goods oligopoly,
studied in detail in Hinnosaar (2019).
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1. The contest that minimizes the i-th highest payoff has the following structure: i− 1
sequential players first, then two players simultaneously, and then the remaining
n− i− 1 players sequentially.
2. The contest that maximizes the i-th highest payoff is n = (i, n − i) when i ≤ i =
−12 +
√
5
4 + n and the simultaneous contest when i ≥ i.
This confirms the findings from proposition 2 (the lowest payoff is minimized by se-
quential and maximized by simultaneous contest) and proposition 4 (the highest payoff
is minimized by contest (2, 1, . . . , 1) and maximized by the first-mover contest).
Proof. Let us first consider minimization of the i-th highest payoff ui(x∗). The arguments
state that the players before i should be sequential as well as players after period t. The
remaining question is nt, i.e. how many player to pool with i. This gives a maximization
problem
min
1≤nt≤n+1−i
1
2i−1(1 + nt)
1
(1 + nt)2n−nt
⇐⇒ max
1≤nt≤n+1−i
(1 + nt)22−nt . (17)
Treating nt as a continuous variable and differentiating the objective gives necessary
condition for optimality
2−nt(1 + nt) [2− (1 + nt) log 2] = 0. (18)
Solving this gives nt = 2log 2 −1 ≈ 1.8854. It is straightforward to verify that the objective
is concave for all 1 ≤ nt ≤ n, so the only two candidates for the optimum are n1 = 1
and n1 = 2. The latter is bigger than the former as (1 + 2)22−2 = 94 > (1 + 1)
22−1 = 2.
Therefore optimal nt = 2. We get that the optimal contest is n = (1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
i−1
, 2, 1, . . . , 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n−i−1
).
Now let us consider maximization of the i-th highest payoff ui(x∗). As argued above,
all players before i should be pooled with i, so that player i arrives in period 1. All
players after period t should be pooled together as well, which would lead to a two-period
contest (n1, n− n1) with i ≤ n1 ≤ n (in case n1 = n it is in fact a simultaneous contest).
Therefore the maximization problem is equivalent to
max
i≤n1≤n
1
1 + n1
1
(1 + n1)(1 + n− n1) ⇐⇒ mini≤n1≤n(1 + n1)
2(1 + n− n1). (19)
This problem is concave in the interior, therefore one of the two corners is optimal, either
n1 = i, which gives (1 + i)2(1 + n− i) as the value of the objective, or n1 = n which gives
(1 + n)2. The former is the minimizer if and only if
(1 + i)2(1 + n− i) ≤ (1 + n)2. (20)
Equalizing left-hand-side with the right-hand-side gives and solving for i gives three roots
n and −12±
√
5
4 + n. Lowest root is always negative, and the second one i = −12 +
√
5
4 + n
always strictly between 1 and n.16 Moreover, at i = 0 the condition is clearly violated.
Therefore, we get that for low values i ≤ i the condition is violated and therefore the
optimal contest is n = (i, n − i), whereas for high values i ≥ i the condition is satisfied
and therefore the optimal contest is simultaneous n = (n).
16Since 1 < i = − 12 +
√
5
4 + n ⇐⇒ 1 < n and n > i = − 12 +
√
5
4 + n ⇐⇒ n2 > 1.
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